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A method to analyze the role of familiarity in recognizing pictures of everyday scenes is
introduced. The idea is to manipulate two within-subjects conditions: an experimental condition
where the scenes repeat perceptual information (e.g. buildings and/or vehicles) and a control
condition. The results show the two conditions did not differ in terms of hit rates, but in the
experimental condition there were significantly fewer false alarms, yielding better results, which
supports the findings of past research studies that have used verbal materials. This perceptual
facilitation was maintained throughout a week-long retention interval. Finally, a detailed analysis
of this facilitation shows it was due to a significant reduction in false alarms on know judgments,
emphasizing familiarity’s role in explaining this effect.
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Presentamos un método para analizar el papel que la familiaridad juega en el reconocimiento
de fotografías de escenas cotidianas. La idea consiste en manipular dos condiciones intrasujeto:
una condición experimental en la que se presentan fotografías en las que se repite información
perceptual (p.e. edificios y/o vehículos) frente a otra condición control. Los resultados muestran
que no hay diferencias en las tasas de aciertos de ambas condiciones, pero sí una reducción
significativa de las falsas alarmas en la condición experimental, lo que provoca una mejor
rendimiento en esta condición, patrón de resultados que coincide con el hallado utilizando
materiales verbales. Dicha facilitación perceptual se mantiene así mismo tras una semana del
estudio de los materiales. Por último el análisis pormenorizado de dicha facilitación nos muestra
que es debida principalmente a una reducción significativa de las falsas alarmas en los juicios
saber, lo que remarca el papel que la familiaridad juega en la explicación de dicho efecto.
Palabras clave: familiaridad, reconocimiento de fotografías, juicios de recordar y saber.
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Recognizing a past experience may be based either on
the conscious retrieval of an episodic trace (or recollection)
or on an automatic sense of familiarity (or “déjà vu”)
without recollecting specific details (familiarity; see e.g.
Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2002, for a review). There is
increasingly neurological evidence to support the idea that
recollection and familiarity are two independent processes
with differing neurological bases: the hippocampus and left
prefrontal cortex seem to be involved in retrieving episodic
traces, while the neighboring perirhinal cortex and
parahippocampal structures are associated with familiarity
(see Aggleton & Brown, 2006; Anderson et al., 2008; Diana,
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Westerberg, Paller,
Holdstock, Mayes, & Reber, 2006). Experimental data have
suggested that with aging and over the course of
neurodegenerative disease, the ability to recollect declines,
while their effects on familiarity are much less apparent
(see e.g. Algarabel et al., 2009; Algarabel, Pitarque, Tomás,
& Mazón, 2010; Algarabel, Rodríguez et al., 2010;
Anderson et al., 2008; Westerberg et al., 2006; Wolk,
Signoff, & DeKosky, 2008; Yonelinas, 2002).
Several experimental procedures have been utilized to
estimate familiarity and recollection (e.g. the dissociation
process paradigm, Jacoby, 1991; the remember/know, or
R/K, paradigm, Tulving, 1985; ROC analysis, Donaldson,
1996; associative pair recognition, Yonelinas, 1997, etc.).
We generally assume that those procedures succeed in
precisely estimating recollection, but estimating familiarity
is much more difficult.
To precisely measure familiarity-based recognition in
our laboratory, a modified version of the procedure by
Parkin et al. (2001) has been utilized, that was previously
justified and successfully employed in other studies (see
Algarabel & Pitarque, 2010; Algarabel et al., 2009;
Algarabel, Pitarque et al., 2010; Algarabel, Rodríguez et
al., 2010; also see Keane, Orlando, & Verfaellie, 2006).
The concept is to distribute participants into two (within-
subjects) recognition conditions: a) an experimental
condition where they study and recognize words made up
of a 13-letter subset of the alphabet (list A), while the new
words introduced during the recognition (distracters) are
comprised of the alphabet’s remaining 13 letters (list B).
This is known as the “non-overlapping condition” (from
here on, simply !O) because words on lists A and B do
not share a single letter; b) a control condition where
participants study and recognize words made up of of the
full alphabet (list C). This condition is referred to as the
“overlapping condition” (from here on, O).
If we ensure that participants are unaware of the
underlying rule behind selection of words into lists A and
B in the !O condition (if not, they should be eliminated
from the statistical analysis), then differential performance
on the !O and O conditions will be due solely to perceptual
familiarity-based recognition of those words, because the
two conditions differ only in the repetition of some letters,
or lack thereof. After the NO recognition task, there is one
forced choice task between list A (the studied list) – list B
(the non-studied list) word pairs, where half the words on
list A had actually been studied and the other half had not
(though participants were led to believe they were). This
would allow us to measure perceptual familiarity by
comparing choice rates on the last task with the number .5
(or probability of a chance hit on the task). The typical
pattern of results using this paradigm (see Algarabel &
Pitarque, 2010; Algarabel et al., 2009; Algarabel, Pitarque
et al., 2010; Algarabel, Rodríguez et al., 2010; Keane et
al., 2006; Parkin et al., 2001) shows similar hit rates across
!O and O conditions on the recognition tasks, while there
is a significantly lower false alarm rate in the !O condition
than in the O condition. Meanwhile, on the forced choice
task, words from the studied list (A) were more often
chosen than words from the unstudied list (B), whether
they had actually studied them before or not. These results
can be interpreted in the sense that perceptual manipulation
(of which subjects were unaware) affects familiarity
judgments (but not recollection judgments).
Most recognition studies conducted in human subjects
have measured memory using verbal stimuli. That is
problematic because familiarity patterns reported in
populations with neurodegenerative disease and in healthy
older adults seem to be influenced, or “contaminated,” by
their verbal capacity and/or level of education. Data
collected in our laboratory has reflected this trend (see e.g.
Algarabel et al., 2009; Algarabel, Rodríguez et al., 2010;
Koontz & Baskys, 2009; Long, Prat, Jones, Morris, &
Jonatan, 2008). That being said, recent studies have
suggested familiarity is not affected by age or cognitive
impairment when the materials consist of images (see e.g.
Ally, Gold, & Budson, 2009; Ballesteros, Reales, & Mayas,
2007; Gutchess & Park, 2009; O’Connor & Ally, 2010).
Likewise, we know people remember images better than
words (“the picture superiority effect,” see e.g. Dewhurst
& Conway, 1994; Nelson, Reed, & Walling, 1976; Paivio,
1971, 1986) and picture memory does not seem to differ
in healthy young people and adults (see e.g. Gutchess &
Park, 2009; Park, Puglisi, & Smith, 1986; Park, Smith,
Morrell, Puglisi, & Dudley, 1990; Smith, Park, Cherry, &
Berkovsky, 1990; Smith, Park, Earles, Shaw, & Whiting,
1998). Therefore, it seems that a procedure based on
recognition of pictures of everyday scenes could be a
suitable procedure to overcome the limitations inherent in
using verbal materials (see e.g. Manier, Apetroaia, Pappas,
& Hirst, 2004).
Therefore, the present study’s first objective will be to
apply the procedure described by Parkin et al. (2001) to
recognition of real-life scenes that meet criteria like those
of word lists A, B, and C. Scenes in list A will include
images of buildings and/or vehicles and/or people in an
urban environment, while list B will include nature scenes
(no buildings, vehicles, or people) and/or animals and/or
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flowers in natural settings; in other words, scenes from lists
A and B (used in the !O condition) will share no perceptual
features. Images in list C (used in the O condition),
however, will share at least one feature with both lists A
and B (e.g. buildings with animals, buildings in natural
settings, vehicles in natural settings, people in natural
settings, people with animals, etc.).
In the literature review, we found studies that relate
to this objective only indirectly. Langley, Cleary, Kostic,
and Woods (2008), for example, analyzed the role of
perceptual information in familiarity-based scene
recognition with the objective of demonstrating that the
“recognition without identification” effect (see Cleary &
Green, 2000; Peynircioglu, 1990) is based solely on
familiarity, as in “tip of the tongue” and “déjà vu” type
experiences. Cleary and Specker (2007) arrived at similar
conclusions using the same experimental paradigm and
pictures of faces as materials; Cleary and Reyes (2009)
did so using nature pictures. Rajaram (1996), on the other
hand, used drawings from Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s
database (1980) and the R/K paradigm, finding that R
judgments were affected by perceptual manipulations like
altering font size (Rajaram, 1996, experiment 2) or spelling
features (Rajaram, 1998). She did not, however, analyze
if perceptual manipulations affect K judgments, because
R and K judgments were not independent in this case.
Meanwhile, Dobbins, Kroll, and Liu (1998) applied ROC
analysis to data collected using the R/K paradigm on scene
recognition tasks to demonstrate that although K judgments
fit with the predictions of signal detection models, R
judgments are governed by contextual demands that affect
the information’s distinctiveness, in support of dual-process
recognition models. Nevertheless, no study has analyzed
the effect of repeating perceptual characteristics on
familiarity-based scene recognition.
This study’s second objective has to do with the role
of repeating perceptual information in false recognition and
how that changes over time. In that vein, Diana, Peterson,
and Reder (2004) demonstrated that repeating certain
perceptual characteristics of words (specifically their font)
increased the rate of false alarms. McCabe, Roediger III,
McDaniel, and Balota (2009), on the other hand, utilized
the R/K paradigm to distinguish between recollection-based
false recognition and familiarity-based false recognition,
showing that age increased the former, but not the latter
(see also e.g. Jacoby, Bishara, Hessels, & Toth, 2005). Given
that the usual pattern of results collected using Parkin et
al.’s paradigm (2001) is to report significant differences
between false alarm rates in !O and O conditions, it would
be interesting to analyze whether that is due to recollection
judgments (which would pose serious problems for dual-
process recognition models according to which an item that
has not been studied cannot be recollected; see e.g. Wixted
& Strech, 2004) or familiarity judgments (due to repeated
automatic activation from the repeated perceptual features).
To do so, we will modify Parkin et al.’s paradigm (2001)
such that on recognition tasks, subjects will not only make
a binary “yes/no” judgment, but a judgment from among
three alternatives: “no/yes by recollection (R)/yes by
familiarity (K)” (see e.g. Diana et al., 2004; McCabe et al.,
2009). This will allow us to analyze in detail how perceptual
repetition affects both correct and false recognitions in R
and K judgments, and how all change with the passage of
time. We will also manipulate temporal conditions between
subjects (immediate recognition vs. one week’s delay; see
e.g. Algarabel, Pitarque, & Gotor, 2006; Diana et al., 2004;
Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; Manier et al., 2004). With
the same objective in mind, in the forced choice task, we
will follow the procedure proposed by Voss and Paller
(2009). That is, we will sequentially present two pictures
and after selecting one, subjects will be asked whether their
choice was based on recollection (R) or familiarity (K).
Method
Participants
Thirty five students from the Psychology Department
at the University of Valencia participated in this study, with
an average age of 22.81 years (SD = 8.09 years; age range
20 to 54 years-old; 3 were men, the rest women). They
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: either
immediate recognition or recognition after a retention
interval of one week. Three subjects were eliminated
because they were partially aware of the underlying rule
behind scene selection in the !O condition. Ultimately,
each condition included 16 participants.
Materials
From a database of nature scene pictures in color
(compiled by the authors), three lists were formed (A, B,
C) of 64 pictures each. All were in color with a 1,024 (wide)
x 768 (tall) pixel format. The pictures in list A included
images of buildings, and/or vehicles, and/or people in an
urban environment, while pictures in list B included images
of nature scenes (no buildings, cars, or people), and/or
animals, and/or flowers in natural settings. Therefore,
pictures from lists A and B (utilized in the !O condition)
shared no perceptual characteristics. Pictures from list C,
on the other hand (utilized in the O condition), shared at
least one characteristic with list A and one with list B (e.g.
buildings with animals, buildings in natural settings, vehicles
in natural settings, people in natural settings, people with
animals, etc.). The criterion for selecting the 64 pictures in
each list was to ask two judges to independently assess (on
a scale from 1 to 3 points) how well each picture fit its
particular list’s criteria (e.g. for list A, “images of buildings,
and/or vehicles, and/or people in an urban environment,”
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etc.). A picture became part of the list if both judges agreed
in assigning it the highest score, such that between-judges
reliability for all three lists equaled 1. Subsequently, 10
students from outside the research team were asked to
assess, on a scale from 1 to 5 points, the pleasantness of
the 64 pictures in each list. This yielded no significant
differences in average evaluations of the three lists (F(2,
18) < 1, ns).
Design
Two independent variables were manipulated in the
recognition tasks: 2 overlap conditions (!O vs. O; within-
subjects) x 2 moments in time (immediate testing vs. testing
after one week’s delay; between-subjects). The dependent
variables included hit rates (H), false alarm rates (FA), and
the discrimination indices (d’; see Table 1). Table 2 displays
the hit rates broken down into R judgment hits (HR) and
K judgment hits (HK). Similarly, FA rates are broken down
into R judgment FAs (FAR) and K judgment FAs (FAK).
On the forced choice task (CHOICE), two moments in
time were manipulated between subjects (immediate vs.
delayed test). The dependent variables were, first, hit rate
on images the participants actually studied (old) and, second,
the rate of choosing stimuli that were not actually studied,
but that belonged to the studied list (new-studied). In Table
2, those rates are broken down into R and K judgments.
Procedure
In the immediate test condition (IMM), each participant
carried out two study and recognition tasks with two lists
of pictures (presentation order was counterbalanced across
subjects):
First, a set of 44 pictures randomly selected from list
C were studied (40 target stimuli, plus two filler pictures
at the beginning and end of each sequence that were not
tested later). They were presented in random order for 1,000
milliseconds each at the center of a computer monitor
against a white background, separated by a 500 millisecond
interval (white background). Next, subjects performed a
distractor task for 5 minutes (simple arithmetic), then were
presented with a new recognition task using 40 pictures
(20 studied before and 20 new, also from list C). With each
picture presented, participants decided whether they
recognized it as having been presented before because they
remembered details about it (by pushing the R key), it was
familiar despite not remembering details about it (by
pushing F), or if they thought it had not been presented
before (by pushing N). This was done in accordance with
the procedure described in Diana et al. (2004) and McCabe
et al. (2009). Prior to performing this recognition task, the
differences between “remembering” and “knowing” were
explained to subjects using Rajaram’s instructions (1993),
which in short, draw the distinction, respectively, between
recognition based on retrieving episodic traces from the
item, or on a mere sense of familiarity lacking any specific,
episodic information. Each picture remained on the screen
until the subject responded. These recognition trials
comprised the overlapping condition (O).
Second, each subject studied another set of 44 pictures
randomly selected from either list A or list B (40 target
stimuli, plus two filler stimuli at the beginning and end of
each sequence), presented for 1,000 milliseconds. Next,
subjects performed another distractor task for 5 minutes,
followed by another recognition task with 40 pictures (20
recently studied and 20 new ones from the complementary
list; so if they had studied pictures from list A, the new
ones were from B and vice versa). They responded the
same way as in the above recognition task. These
recognition trials comprised the non-overlapping condition
(!O).
Always after the !O recognition task, subjects
completed a forced choice task made up of 40 picture pairs
(one was always from list A and one from list B). They
were presented sequentially for 2,000 milliseconds each
(and labeled at the bottom as “picture A” and “picture B,”
respectively), separated by a 500 millisecond interval (white
background), as per the procedure described by Voss and
Paller (2009). The task was to decide which of the two
pictures they thought they had seen previously in the study
task, photo A or B (by typing either A or B), then to decide
whether that choice was based on details they remembered
about it, or on familiarity (by typing either R or F). In both
decisions, subjects had unlimited time to respond. The
instructions emphasized that they had always studied one
of the pictures in each pair, which was only true half of
the time (old). The other half of the time, participants had
not actually seen the picture before, but it belonged to the
studied list (new-studied). For each subject, we randomized
both the pairs’ presentation order and whether the picture
from list A or B appeared first or second within the pair.
Finally, a short questionnaire was administered to each
participant to ascertain what strategies they had utilized to
respond to the previous recognition and forced choice tasks,
so as to exclude any participants who had become aware
of the relationship between the pictures in lists A and B
(!O condition). Anyone who reported responding based on
some repeated features or on the dichotomy between a
natural vs. urban environment were eliminated (3 were
eliminated for this reason; this proportion is on a par with
those reported in previous research using lexical materials).
Furthermore, we applied statistical control over the data in
order to detect any subjects aware of the relationship
between the pictures in lists A and B: the idea was that if
a subject realized the relationship at the time, either their
hit rate in the !O recognition condition would be close to
1, or in the forced choice task, the rate at which they
selected unstudied pictures belonging to the studied list
(new-studied) would also be close to 1. It was decided that
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we would eliminate participants if one of those two rates
was greater than or equal to .95, but no subject ended up
being eliminated due to those criteria.
In the test condition with a one-week delay (DEL),
participants viewed the two lists employed in the previous
study (list C and either A or B, counterbalanced and
separated by 5 minutes’ rest) and were asked to return a
week later to complete the two recognition tasks (also duly
counterbalanced), the forced choice task, and to fill out the
questionnaire. In addition, they were asked not to
consciously try to remember the pictures during their week
away, and not to speak amongst themselves about the
study’s objectives.
It took participants about 30 minutes to complete the
above tasks.
Results
First, to ensure the materials and procedures employed
were appropriate, we ensured that neither the list presented
(A or B) nor presentation order of the conditions (first !O,
then O, or vice versa) would affect the dependent variables
analyzed (hits and false alarms in the !O and O conditions
on the two recognition tasks, and hits on the forced choice
task). A MANOVA was carried out to assess the effects of
2 lists x 2 presentation orders on these dependent variables,
revealing that neither the main effects nor their interaction
were significant. These results verify the adequacy of the
materials and procedures employed.
Next, we analyzed hit rates on the recognition tasks
(see Table 1) by means of a mixed ANOVA with 2
overlapping conditions (!O vs. O; within) x 2 moments in
time (IMM vs. DEL tests; between). That analysis
determined that neither the overlapping conditions’ main
effect nor their interaction was significant, but the main
effect of moment in time was marginally significant F(1,
30) = 3.92, p < .06, η2p = .12, in that the hit rate after one
week (.68) was lower than in the immediate test (.76).
A similar ANOVA analyzing FAs (see Table 1) revealed
the main effects of both overlapping conditions to be
significant F(1, 30) = 98.65, p < .001, η2p = .77, along with
moment in time F(1, 30) = 26.78, p < .001, η2p = .47, while
the interaction between those two variables was not
significant. This indicates there were more FAs in the O
condition (.30) than the !O condition (.08), and more on
the DEL test (.26) than the IMM test (.13).
To calculate individual d’ values for each subject, we
substituted (if there were any) hit rates of 1 for .98 and
false alarm rates of 0 for .02 (see Macmillan & Creelman,
1991). The mixed 2x2 ANOVA on d’ values (see Table 1)
showed that both the main effects of overlap condition F(1,
30) = 71.20, p < .001, η2p = .70 and moment in time F(1,
30) = 37.46, p < .001, η2p = .56 were significant, while
their interaction was not. This indicates that performance
in the !O condition (2.25) was better than in the O
condition (1.13) and better on the IMM test (2.11) than the
DEL test (1.26).
We went on to analyze data from the forced choice task
(CHOICE; see Table 1). Regarding the images actually
studied (old), they were better recalled on the IMM test
than the DEL test (t(30) = 4.36, p < .001), and both means
differed significantly from .50, the probability of a chance
hit t(15) = 21.19, p < .001, t(15) = 12.19, p < .001,
respectively. As for the images not seen before but
belonging to the studied list (new-studied), the difference
between the IMM and DEL tests was not significant, but
both means differed significantly from the value .50 t(15)
= 7.71, p < .001; t(15) = 6.26, p < .001, respectively. This
clearly entails that perceptual familiarity played a role in
that task.
These findings replicate the results reported by other
laboratories using lexical materials (see e.g. Algarabel &
Pitarque, 2010; Algarabel et al., 2009; Algarabel, Pitarque
et al., 2010; Algarabel, Rodríguez et al., 2010; Keane et
al., 2006; Parkin et al., 2001) by showing that the perceptual
facilitation found in the !O recognition condition, as
compared to the O condition, is not due to differences in
hit rate, but to a lower rate of false alarms in the !O
condition. On the other hand, on the forced choice task,
subjects tended to subconsciously choose materials from
the studied list, whether they had been studied before or
not, because they shared certain perceptual features repeated
throughout the study task. Last, the passage of time was
found to decrease hits and increase false alarms
proportionally in the two overlap conditions.
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Table 1
Mean !umber (and SEM) of Hits (H), False Alarms (FA) and d’ in the !on-overlapping (!O OVER) vs. Overlapping
(OVER) Conditions of Immediate and Delayed Recognition (IMM and DEL), as Well as Average !umber of Hits on Previously
Studied Stimuli (old) and Unstudied Stimuli from the Studied List (new-studied) on the Forced Choice Task (CHOICE)
NO OVER (NO) OVER (O) CHOICE
H FA d’ H FA d’ old new-studied
INM .78 (.03) .02 (.02) 2.74 (.16) .74 (.04) .23 (.03) 1.48 (.11) .93 (.02) .78 (.04)
DEL .71 (.03) .14 (.02) 1.75 (.16) .66 (.04) .37 (.03) .77 (.11) .79 (.02) .70 (.03)
With respect to our study’s second objective, we will
now analyze the role of our manipulations, breaking down
hits and false alarms into R and K judgments (see Table 2).
We began by analyzing hit rates on R judgments (HR;
see Table 2) using a mixed ANOVA with 2 overlapping
conditions (!O vs. O; within) x 2 moments in time (IMM
vs. DEL tests; between). This revealed the only significant
main effect was that of moment in time F(1, 30) = 16.97,
p < .001, η2p = .36, because R judgments’ hit rate after a
week (.31) was lower than on the IMM test (.54). A similar
ANOVA applied to hit rates on K judgments (HK; see Table
2), likewise, showed that only the main effect of moment
in time F(1, 30) = 13.93, p = .001, η2p = .32 was significant,
but in the opposite direction. K judgments’ hit rate after a
week (.37) was higher than on the IMM test (.22). In sum,
the passage of time lowered R hits while increasing K hits
in both overlapping conditions. This indicates that due to
the loss of episodic traces over time, R responses became
K responses (see e.g. Algarabel et al., 2006; Knowlton &
Squire, 1995).
With regards to false alarms in R judgments (FAR; see
Table 2), the ANOVA showed the main effects of
overlapping condition and moment in time were significant,
but their interaction was not F(1, 30) = 9.22, p = .005, η2p
= .24; F(1, 30) = 4.95, p < .05, η2p = .14, respectively,
because they made more FAs on R in the O condition (.06)
than the !O condition (.03) and more on the DEL test (.06)
than the IMM test (.03). The ANOVA applied to false
alarms in K judgments (FAK; see Table 2) showed a similar
pattern of results: the main effects of the overlapping
conditions and moment in time turned out to be significant,
but their interaction did not F(1, 30) = 115.40, p < .001,
η2p = .79; F(1, 30) = 16.40, p < .001, η2p = .35,
respectively. This shows that more FAs on K were made
in the O condition (.24) than the !O condition (.06) and
on the DEL test (.20) than the IMM test (.10). These results
clearly convey that the explanation for the perceptual
facilitation effect found using Parkin et al.’s paradigm
(2001), and words as well as images, suggests that the
decrease in false alarms in the !O condition is mainly due
to a decrease in FAKs.
Next, we analyzed data from the forced choice task
(CHOICE; see Table 2). There were more HR on the images
actually studied (old) on the IMM test than the DEL test
t(30) = 4.42, p < .001, but there were more HK on the DEL
test than the IMM test t(30) = 2.53, p < .05. This pattern
reiterates the results of the two recognition tasks. Concerning
images that were not studied previously but belonged to
the studied list (new-studied), the difference between the
IMM and DEL tests was not significant on R judgments,
but it was on K judgments, favoring the IMM test t(30) =
2.20, p < .05. This indicates familiarity is also the main
source of the perceptual facilitation reflected in this last
dependent variable.
Some authors (see e.g. Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006;
Yonelinas, 2002) argue that utilizing the R/K paradigm, K
responses do not measure an item’s true familiarity, but
rather the probability that it is familiar when episodic
information is not available, such that K responses
underestimate familiarity. With that in mind, it has been
proposed that true familiarity (F) can be estimated by an
equation proposed by Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995), F =
K/(1-R). We plugged our data into that equation and yielded
virtually the same results as the ones discussed above
corresponding to K responses. More specifically, a mixed
ANOVA was carried out with 2 overlapping conditions (!O
vs. O) x 2 moments in time (IMM vs. DEL tests) on F hit
rates, showing that neither overlapping conditions nor time,
nor their interaction, had a significant effect. An ANOVA
applied to F false alarms yielded the same results as the
ANOVA on K judgment false alarms. Both the main effects
of overlapping conditions and moment in time were
significant F(1, 30) = 106.86, p < .001, η2p = .78; F(1, 30)
= 18.89, p < .001, η2p = .39, respectively, but their
interaction was not. This confirms that more familiarity
FAs were made in the O condition (.26) than the !O
condition (.06), and more on the DEL test (.21) than the
IMM test (.11). Finally, analyses on F in the forced choice
task revealed higher hit rates on the IMM test than the DEL
test in the case of images actually studied .86 and .70,
respectively; t(30) = 2.99, p = .005, as well as and those
that were not, but belonged to the studied list .75 and .64,
respectively; t(30) = 2.07, p < .05.
This second block of results conveys that on recognition
and forced choice tasks, with the passage of time, R
judgment hits decrease, while K judgment hits increase.
By the same token, time increased false recognitions in the
case of both R and K judgments. Last, data from the forced
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Table 2
Mean !umber (and SEM) of Hits (H) and False Alarms (FA) from Table 1 Broken Down into Recollection (R) and
Familiarity (K) Judgments
NO OVER (NO) OVER (O) CHOICE
H R H K FA R FA K H R H K FA R FA K old-R old-K new-stud-R new-stud-K
INM .56 (.04) .22 (.03) .01 (.01) .02 (.02) .52 (.04) .22 (.04) .04 (.01) .19 (.02) .56 (.05) .37 (.04) .13 (.03) .66 (.04)
DEL .31 (.04) .39 (.03) .04 (.02) .11 (.02) .31 (.04) .34 (.04) .08 (.02) .29 (.02) .27 (.04) .52 (.04) .16 (.03) .54 (.03)
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choice task show that in recognizing an image one actually
studied, episodic components as well as familiarity
intervene. Yet when recognizing an image not actually
studied that belongs to the studied list, mainly familiarity
components intervene. This supports our use of this
procedure here.
Discussion
First of all, these results convey a significant perceptual
facilitation in the !O condition compared to the O
condition, not because there was a higher hit rate in the
!O condition (which would suggest facilitation was
conscious and invalidate our procedure), but to a lower rate
of false alarms. Along those lines, our results support
numerous others in asserting that implicit processes have
an impact on recognition (which is an explicit or conscious
process; see e.g. Cleary & Green, 2000; Langley et al.,
2008; Manier et al, 2004). These results reiterate the findings
of studies that have used verbal materials (see e.g. Algarabel
& Pitarque, 2010; Algarabel et al., 2009; Algarabel, Pitarque
et al., 2010; Algarabel, Rodríguez et al., 2010; Keane et
al., 2006; Parkin et al., 2001) and demonstrate that pictorial
materials like the ones presented here would be adequate
to elicit that effect in populations with verbal impairment.
In addition, because pictures are holistically encoded,
familiarity can be used as a compensatory mechanism for
retrieval in populations with memory deficits (see e.g.
Quamme, Yonelinas, & Norman, 2007).
On another note, the perceptual facilitation observed
was maintained for a week after the materials were studied,
which would be hard to explain using single-process models
of recognition based solely on enhancing the memory trace.
This data is congruent with data from other laboratories
(see e.g. Algarabel et al., 2009; Algarabel, Rodríguez et al.,
2010; Anderson et al., 2008; Parkin et al., 2001) in showing
that familiarity does not decline with age, but recollection
does. Evidence for the same pattern of results was found
in the forced choice task, considering the rate of actually
unstudied images chosen that really belonged to the studied
list. We have confirmed here that this task is another valid
procedure to estimate this perceptual facilitation. We
previously expressed (see e.g. Algarabel, Pitarque et al.,
2010), and these data seem to verify, that the facilitation
we found here seems to be more the result of an implicit
learning (like grammar learning; see e.g. Reber, 1967) of
the covariations among perceptual and conceptual features
repeated across different pictures.
Next, our analysis of hits on the immediate test
demonstrates they were due to both R and K responses
(though R was predominant). On the delayed test,
meanwhile, probably due to a loss of episodic details over
time, a clear conversion from R responses to K responses
occurred (see e.g. Knowlton & Squire, 1995). On the other
hand, our false alarms analysis reveals that the majority
involved K judgments, which increase over time. This also
occurred in the case of R false alarms, though to a lesser
extent. Our global results on R and K hit and false alarm
rates support recent meta-analysis data (Gardiner, Ramponi,
& Richardson-Klavehn, 2002; McCabe et al., 2009) and
data gathered in other laboratories (see e.g. Algarabel et
al., 2006; Diana et al., 2004; Dudukovic & Knowlton,
2006), which endorses the methodology employed here and
substantiates the postulates of dual-process models of
memory (see e.g. Yonelinas, 2002).
Finally, regarding this study’s second objective in
particular, that is, to compare FAs in the !O and O
conditions, which is essential to understanding the perceptual
facilitation repeatedly observed using this paradigm, our
data show that in the control, O condition, significantly
more FAs were produced than in the !O condition.
Furthermore, the majority occurred on K judgments. The
manipulation applied in the !O experimental condition
brought about a drastic reduction in said FAs (e.g. Israel
& Schacter, 1997, showed that distinctive perceptual
information leads subjects to make fewer false recognitions,
as occurred in our !O condition). This demonstrates that
familiarity is more sensitive to perceptual manipulations
than recollection is, as dual-process models postulate.
By way of summary, the data presented here replicate
past findings using verbal materials and enable us to
recommend employing pictures of natural scenes to
determine perceptual familiarity-based recognition. On
another note, comparing data from the immediate and
delayed tests demonstrates that this perceptual facilitation
is a long-lasting effect, one that cannot be explained merely
by automatic activation of repeated perceptual features. It
has more to do with an implicit learning of the underlying
rules behind the !O condition’s materials. Finally, our
analysis of the pattern of perceptual facilitation suggests it
resulted from a lower number of FAs in the !O condition
than in the O, control condition. In both conditions, the
majority of FAs took place in K judgments.
Thanks to the data collected here, our next objective
will be to apply the procedure and materials employed here
in samples of different age groups and/or levels of
neurodegenerative disease (e.g. healthy adults, mild
cognitive impairment, Alzheimer’s disease). This would
contribute conclusive data to the controversies over whether
familiarity declines with age or not, and as to the
progression of neurodegenerative disease (see e.g. O’Connor
& Ally, 2010).
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